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like  Pertamina  (until  its  downfall)  as  vehicles  to  achieve  these  two 
objectives.’’  This  position  allies  the  technicians  with  members  of  the 
intelligentsia who see state enterprises as the way to counterbalance Chinese 
domination of the corporate sector. 
The technicians’ control of  the Ministry of  Trade has allowed them to 
encourage domestic production of manufactured goods, including airplanes. 
Given  the  strong  sense  of  economic  nationalism  in  Indonesia  and  the 
widespread belief  that  only  industrialization (regardless of  whether  it  is 
import-competing or export-oriented) holds the key to a higher standard of 
living, the technicians enjoy popular support among the Indonesian elite. 
Furthermore, their import-substitution industrialization has won  them the 
support of the army, the most powerful constituency in the country. Thanks 
to  the  dwifungsi  doctrine,  the  expansion  of  state  enterprises translates 
directly into more managerial positions for senior military personnel. It must 
be noted that since most of  the import-competing industries were set up in 
urban Java, the higher prices of manufactured goods represented an implicit 
tax on residents of the rural sector and the Outer Islands. 
In looking at the political setting within which policies are chosen, we 
have  identified  an  important  political  coalition  of  technocrats,  Outer 
Islanders, and rural residents which favors a political package emphasizing 
the maintenance of  a competitive exchange rate. The fact that there exists a 
strong institutional memory about the economically destructive effects of an 
overvalued exchange rate means that the government is naturally disposed to 
the arguments for a competitive exchange rate.  Since a debt crisis occurs 
when a government runs out of  foreign reserves, this emphasis on avoiding 
prolonged exchange rate  overvaluation reduces  the  probability  of  a  debt 
crisis by keeping the (foreign exchange earning) nonoil export sector healthy 
and  capital  flight low.  We  shall show  in  subsequent chapters how  these 
political  and  economic  factors  have  influenced  the  setting of  economic 
policies and, hence, the performance of the economy. 
4  The Fiscal System 
4.1  Introduction 
The  two  arguments  we  are  developing  in  this  monograph  are  that 
appropriate exchange rate management was fundamental to why a debt crisis 
did not appear during 1982-84  and that the exchange rate policy was heavily 
influenced by  political considerations. The aim of  this chapter is to test the 68  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
validity of  the second argument by  examining the fiscal system to see if  its 
functioning is in accord with the political concerns to prevent impoverish- 
ment of  the rural sector and to show equitable treatment of the main islands. 
We  picked  the  fiscal  system  because  it  is  largely  controlled  by  the 
technocrats, and we have claimed in  chapter 3 that the technocrats favor an 
economic  strategy which  has  as  its  side  effects  (if  not  as  its  aims)  the 
alleviation of rural poverty and the reduction of regional differences. 
We  will discuss the control and performance of the overall fiscal balance 
in chapter 7 where the subject of  external debt management is explored in 
detail.  A comparative analysis of  external debt  due  to  cumulated budget 
deficits is done in chapter 8. It is more natural to examine the accumulation 
of  external debt due to fiscal deficits together with the management issues 
involved. 
4.2  The Revenue Structure, 1969-83 
In  assessing the tax  system before the December  1983 tax  reform,  it  is 
important  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  collection  of  taxes  did  not  usually 
correspond  closely to  the  tax  laws. The  shortage of  competent personnel 
made enforcement of  the highly complicated Indonesian tax code impossi- 
ble. The result was  “that  the tax  revenue targets published in the budgets 
determined the amounts which administrators felt obliged to collect”  (Booth 
and McCawley  1981b, 136). Since the amount of  taxes actually paid was 
nearly always a negotiated outcome, annual changes in  income taxes bore 
little relation to the marginal tax rates. In short, the vertical and horizontal 
equity aspects of  the income tax system cannot be accurately gleaned from 
the pre-1984 tax code. Furthermore,  the tax burden owed to the state was 
consistently understated  by  the  total amount of  revenue collected.  This is 
because of  widespread petty corruption and occasional unauthorized levies 
on business transactions by administrative and military personnel. 
The  data  in  table  4.1  show  the  revenue  structure  of  the  central 
government, and they differ from the official classifications in  three ways. 
Our total revenue figures from fiscal 1969 to fiscal 1971 are greater than the 
official figures by  the amount of  IPEDA because IPEDA was not included in 
central government revenue figures prior to  1972. (IPEDA stands for Iuran 
Pembangunan Daerah which means Contribution to Regional Development.) 
IPEDA  is  revenue  which  belongs  to  the  provincial  authorities  and  is 
collected on the provinces’ behalf by  the central government. The “tax  on 
nonoil income”  category differs from the official definition in that it covers 
only personal income, corporate income, and withholding taxes; the “other 
taxes”  subcategory under the official definition has been added to the  “tax 
on  nonoil  domestic  consumption”  category  in  the  table.’  The  third 
difference is that we  have constructed a “tax  from oil sector”  category by 
combining official subcategories-the  “tax  revenue from oil corporations” Table 4.1  Revenue Structure, FY1969  to FY1983  (in billions of  Rupiahs) 
69/70  70171  71/72  72/73  73/74  74/75  75/76  76/77  77/78  78/79  79/80  80181  81/82  82/83  83/84 
Total revenue 
Tax  on nonoil income 
Tax  on oil and gas 
Tax  on nonoil domestic 
consumption 
Tax  on international  trade 
Tax  on property, IPEDA 
Nontax receipt 
Share of  total revenue (%) 
Tax  on nonoil income 
Tax  on oil and gas 
Tax  on nonoil domestic 
consumption 
Tax on international  trade 
Tax  on property, IPEDA 
Nontax receipt 
Share of nonoil revenue (%) 
Income tax 
Domestic consumption tax 
International trade 
Nontax receipt 
Indicative ratios (%) 
Total revenue/GDP 
Oil and gas tax/ GDP 
Nonoil income tax/GDP 
Property tax/GDP 
Nonoil income tax/ 
domestic consumption tax 
Nonoil export tax/ 
total revenue 
Memo  items 
Tax  on nonoil exports 
Nominal GDP 










































































































3,672.0  4,564.0 


























































































































































































































































































24,002.5  34,344.7  48,913.5  58,421.3  62,646.5  73,697.6 
58.4  77.4  100.0  111.2  119.6  136.3 
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item from the direct tax category and the “other oil revenue” from the taxes 
on domestic consumption category. The second subcategory is  zero  after 
1977/78 because the government stopped taxing the domestic use of oil and 
started subsidizing its use instead, changing what was formerly a revenue 
item  to  an  expenditure  item.  Taxes  on  domestic  consumption  consist 
primarily of  sales tax (which after 1984/85 includes value-added taxes) and 
excises. Prior to  1986 the property tax consisted only of  IPEDA, the land 
tax. Nontax receipts are mainly the profits of  state-owned enterprises. 
The  most  notable  feature  of  table  4.1  is  the  central  government’s 
increasing reliance on oil as its chief source of  revenue. Oil revenue as a 
share of total federal revenue rose from 26 percent in  1969/70 to 55 percent 
in  1974/75, and peaked at 71 percent in 1981/82. The fiscal danger of such a 
narrow tax base was brought home dramatically in  1982 when  the global 
recession caused oil prices to collapse. Oil revenue (in 1980 rupiahs) fell 
from Rp 7.8 billion in  1981/82 to Rp 6.9 billion in  1982/83, causing real 
total  revenue  to  fall  for  the  first  time  since  the  Soekarno years.  The 
continued real revenue decline in  the succeeding years as oil prices began 
their free fall from $36/barrel to $18/barrel wreaked havoc with the financing 
of  expenditure, especially of development projects. It is, hence, only natural 
that since December 1983 the government has passed several tax reforms to 
broaden the tax base. 
The need  for  action is  well  illustrated by  the  fact  that  nonoil revenue 
normalized by GDP has fallen from the 1969-71  average of 8 percent to the 
1980-82  average of  6 percent. The fact that Indonesia was adhering to its 
balanced budget rule and the inflow of oil revenue had been enormous does 
not  justify the decision to allow the tax  base to  shrink.  The government 
could have  broadened the tax base and still adhered to its balanced budget 
rule. All it had to do was reduce its foreign borrowing. Foreign borrowing 
obviated  the  introduction of  unpopular  measures  to  make  tax  collection 
broader and  more effective. Since the ease of  external borrowing was  no 
doubt helped by the existence of  substantial oil reserves, we can attribute the 
absence of base broadening largely to the two oil booms. 
It  appears  that  the  “tax-negotiating’’  form  of  tax  collection  in  the 
1969-83  period did not undermine the spirit of progressiveness which the 
pre-1984  Indonesian  tax  code  aspired  to  achieve.  The  fact  that  the 
nonoil-income-tax/GDP ratio exhibits a slow, rising trend indicates that the 
actual marginal rates are mildly progressive. 
Indirect evidence suggests quite strongly that progressivity increased in 
the  1969-83  period. This statement is  based  on  the common belief  that 
direct  income  taxes  are  progressive  and  indirect  consumption  taxes  are 
regressive. The Indonesian ratio of direct income tax to indirect consumption 
tax  has been  increasing over time. Income taxes were only 84 percent of 
consumption taxes in  1969/70, but averaged over 120 percent in  1980-83. 71  IndonesidChapter 4 
Indirect taxes  increased more  slowly than  direct taxes  as real  per  capita 
income doubled in the same period. It may be true that the rich did not pay 
the high taxes required by  the tax code, but  in  light of the two preceding 
indicators of  vertical equity,  it cannot  be  said that  this  was  done  at  the 
expense of the poor. 
We  are unable to analyze the incidence of  taxes along rural-urban and 
regional divisions because the revenue data is not disaggregated enough to 
permit such an examination. There are two items in table 4.1, however, that 
permit us to make a partial assessment of our hypothesis that an agricultural 
bias existed in Indonesian fiscal policy. The first item is the ratio of IPEDA 
land  tax  to  nonoil  income tax  which  has  shown  a  secular decline since 
1969/70; IPEDA is paid almost entirely by  landowners in rural areas, while 
income  tax  is  paid  by  urban  residents.  This  ratio,  together  with  the 
increasing direct tdindirect tax ratio, suggest that the tax burden in the rural 
sector has not increased at the same pace as in the urban sector. 
The second item suggestive of agricultural sector bias is the large decline 
in revenue from nonoil export taxes (see memo item in the table) and from 
import taxes. As pointed out earlier, nonoil exports are largely agricultural 
products like rubber, palm oil, timber, coffee, tea, and spices. In April 1976 
the export duties on most agricultural exports were reduced from  10 to 5 
percent, and  subsequently to zero. While there is  no doubt that the large 
decline in export tax revenue is a big transfer to the agricultural sector, the 
almost equally dramatic phasing out of  import taxes did  not result in the 
same degree of transfer.2  This is because the import tariff in some cases was 
replaced by nontariff barriers such as quotas and monopoly import licenses. 
It is reasonable to believe that the government would  not have allowed 
part of  this import tax revenue to be transferred as economic rents to certain 
segments of  the  industrial  elite  if  the treasury  were  not  awash  with  oil 
revenue. This is the second instance of tax base erosion permitted by the oil 
boom,  the  first being  the  postponement  of  tax  reforms because  of  easy 
external credit. 
4.3  The 1984 Tax Changes and Their Aftermath 
With  the  onset  of  the  worldwide  recession  in  1982,  there  was  an 
across-the-board fall  in  Indonesian exports.  The  severity of  this  external 
shock caused the real GDP growth rate to fall from 6.8 percent in  1981 to 
0.1 percent in 1982. The oil sector was particularly badly hit, with oil export 
earnings plummeting from U.S.  $18 billion in  1981 to U.S.  $15 billion in 
1982. Because oil taxes accounted for 70 percent of  domestic revenue in 
1981, the  collapse  in  oil  exports  exerted  severe  financial  pressures  on 
government spending.  The Indonesian government reacted swiftly against 
the financial crisis and the low level of  economic activity: the rupiah was 72  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
devalued by  38  percent against  the  dollar in  March  1983 to boost  nonoil 
exports,  and  some  forty-seven  capital-intensive  projects  were  postponed 
indefinitely. 
It was clear that  greater internal  resource  mobilization  was necessary  to 
make up for the immediate revenue shortfall and to broaden the tax base to 
prevent the reoccurrence  of  major financial crises arising from overreliance 
on one revenue source. There were a number of hopeful signs that a lot more 
revenue  could  be  extracted  from  the  nonpetroleum  sector  if  better 
enforcement  were  undertaken.  The  most  hopeful  sign  was  that  only  60 
percent of  the taxpayers  who had filed returns  in  1979/80 did so again the 
following year. 
In  December  1983  the  Indonesian  government  announced  a  drastic 
revision of the personal and corporate income taxes which would take effect 
on  1 January  1984.  The complicated  and  steeply  progressive  income tax 
structure  was  simplified  to  three  rates-15  percent,  25  percent,  and  35 
percent-which  applied to both personal  and corporate taxpayers.  To make 
enforcement easier, the cutoff point beyond which people had to pay income 
tax was doubled to render only 10  to 15 percent of  the population eligible for 
income  taxation.  Greater attention was  put  on  withholding  as the way  to 
collect  personal  income taxes.  Corporations were  required  to withhold  15 
percent of interest, rents, royalties,  and dividends to domestic residents  and 
20 percent of these payments to foreigners. The time-consuming practice of 
collecting  corporate  taxes  by  negotiating  individually  with  the  firm 
concerned  was  replaced  with  complete  self-assessments  by  the  firms 
themselves.  These self-assessments  were  subject to selective  audit by  the 
government to prevent abuses. The commitment to efficiency in the reform 
measures  was  emphasized  by  laying  down  specific  time  limits  for  the 
government  to refund  excess taxes  and  to respond  to appeals  against  its 
rulings. 
Later  on in  1984 the Indonesian  government sought to increase  the  tax 
rolls by announcing that taxpayers who registered by June 1985 were eligible 
for  a  pardon  of  past  unpaid  taxes.  The broadening  of  the  tax  base  was 
impressive-there  were 995,000 registered  income taxpayers at the end of 
1985 compared to  the 550,000 registered  in March  1984. The tax  amnesty 
program resulted in adding Rp 52 billion to 1985186 revenue (IMF 1986a). It 
needs to be noted, however,  that  while the procedural  reforms  and simpler 
tax  code reduced  the administrative  burden  and the incentive  to cheat, the 
biggest bugbear of the Indonesia tax system still remains: shortage of  trained 
personnel.  Until this outstanding personnel problem is resolved, nothing can 
be done about the fact that  in  1985 only 50 percent of registered  corporate 
taxpayers  and 70  percent  of  registered  personal-income taxpayers actually 
filed returns. 
In  April  1985 the complicated sales  tax  with  seven different  rates was 
replaced with a value-added  tax  (VAT) of  10 percent.  Like the response  to 73  IndonesidChapter 4 
the earlier income tax reforms, there was a surge in the number of registered 
VAT  taxpayers40,OOO in December 1985, up from 25,000 in March 1985. 
The disappointing  aspect,,  as  with  the  income tax  case,  is  that  only  41 
percent of  the registered VAT  payers are filing the required monthly returns. 
In January  1986 a new property tax law that  consolidated  IPEDA with six 
other property taxes was introduced and the stamp duty laws were revised. 
The revenue-raising  ability  of  the tax  reform has been  impressive  (see 
table 4.2).  Real  nonoil  income tax  rose from  1.3 trillion  rupiahs  in  fiscal 
1983 to 1.7 trillion  in fiscal  1986. The success of  the VAT  was even more 
impressive: it boosted the revenue from domestic consumption by 94 percent 
in the first year of its introduction.  A further rise of 30  percent  is expected 
Table 4.2  Revenue Structure, FY1982  to FY1987  (in billions of  rupiahs) 
82/83  83/84  84/85  85/86  86/87  87/88 
7ixal revenue 
Tax on nonoil income 
Tax  on oil and gas 
Tax  on nonoil domestic 
consumption 
Tax  on international trade 
Tax  on property, IPEDA 
Nontax receipt 
Share of  total revenue (%) 
Tax  on nonoil income 
Tax  on oil and gas 
Tax  on nonoil domestic 
consumption 
Tax on international trade 
Tax on property, IPEDA 
Nontax receipt 
Share of  nonoil revenue (%) 
Income tax 




Indicative  ratios (%) 
Total revenueiGDP 
Oil and gas taxiCDP 
Nonoil income tax/CDP 
Property tax/GDP 
Nonoil income taxi 
domestic consumption tax 
Nonoil export taxitotal revenue 
Memo items 
Tax  on nonoil exports 
Nominal GDP 













































































































17,832.5  17,236.1 
2,880.5  3,315.9 
9,738.2  6,938.6 
3,317.1  4,481.4 
658.8  732.6 
284.0  274.0 
953.9  1,049.3 
16.2  19.2 
54.6  40.3 
18.6  26.0 
3.7  4.3 
I .6  I .6 
5.3  6.1 
35.6  32.2 
41.0  43.5 
8.1  7. I 
3.5  2.7 
11.8  10.2 
17.6  16.0 
9.6  6.4 
2.8  3.1 
.3  .3 
86.8  74.0 
.4  .4 
78.8  70.9 
101,491.2  107.672.0 
170.9  176.0 
Note:  GDP deflator assumed to rise 3.1 percent in 1986 and 3 percent in 1987. Real GNP assumed to rise 2.4 percent 
in  1986 and 3 percent in  1987. 74  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
for fiscal 1987, increasing (real) consumption taxes by  almost two and half 
times over their fiscal 1984 value. 
The  reduction  of  the  maximum  marginal  rate  from  50  percent  to  35 
percent  did  not  decrease  the  progressiveness of  the  income  tax  system. 
Nonoil  income  taxes  as  a  proportion  of  GDP  rose  from  2.4  percent  in 
1983/84 to 2.8 percent in 1986/87, and were expected to reach 3.1 percent in 
1987/88. Progressiveness in income taxes was enhanced because the income 
tax  reform greatly  increased the number of  people paying taxes.  Further- 
more, with the doubling of  the threshold for tax eligibility, the majority of 
these new  taxpayers are people who have  incomes substantially above the 
average. 
It seems however that the overall effect of the whole tax reform package 
may not be a progressive one. This is because the regressive taxes on nonoil 
domestic consumption  (sales  tax,  VAT,  excises,  and  stamp  duties)  were 
raised much more than progressive taxes on income. The ratio of  income 
taxes to consumption taxes fell by  50 percent in  fiscal  1985, the year that 
VAT  was introduced. 
4.4  The Structure of Central Government Expenditure 
Table 4.3 shows the allocation of  state expenditure according to function. 
Expenditure  is  divided  into  two  categories:  routine  and  development. 
Routine expenditure represents what  is necessary  to  maintain  the  level of 
existing government services, while development spending represents capital 
deepening which expands the productive capacity of  the economy. 
In  the  case  of  Indonesia,  the  official  designation  of  development 
expenditure  does  not  in  many  instances  correspond  to  its  economic 
definition. The biggest misnomer is generally believed to be the payment of 
salary supplements from the development budget to government employees 
for development-related activities. There is great incentive for government 
workers to  initiate many  minor development projects because the average 
salary  in  the  public  sector  is  rather  low  and  the  criteria  for  supplement 
awards  is  quite  broad.  Salary  supplements are  paid  to  civil  servants for 
engaging  in  “development”  activities  such  as  serving  on  the  steering 
committee of  a  new  project,  doing  exercises  in  project  evaluation,  and 
travelling to inspect construction projects. The result is that many members 
of  the bureaucracy receive regular supplements which amount to significant 
portions  of  their  salaries.  The  worst  feature  of  this  scheme  is  that  it 
encourages neglect  of  operations  and  maintenance  activities  in  favor  of 
starting new projects. 
Other items of  routine expenditure that are included in  the development 
budget are fertilizer subsidies and military expenditure. The former is clearly 
an  input  to  the  current  production process,  and  the  latter  contributes to 
capacity creation only in  the broadest sense that viable economic growth is Table 4.3  Expenditure Structure of the Central Government Budget FY1969  to FY1987  (in billions of rupiahs) 
69/70  70171  71/72  72/73  73/74  74/75  75/76  76/77  77/78  78/79 
Total expenditure 
Total routine expenditure 
Personnel 
Debt service 
External debt service 
Internal debt service 
Subsidies to regions 
Food subsidy 
Oil subsidy 
Other routine expenditures 
Total development expenditure 
Regional development 
Fertilizer subsidy 
Agriculture & imgation, 
Industry & mining 
Electric power 
Transportation, tourism & 
communications 
Manpower & transmigration 
Education & culture 
Health & social welfare 
Housing & water supply 




excluding fertilizer subsidy 
participation 
of project aid 






































































































































































































































































(continued) Table 4.3  (continued) 
79/80  SOB1  81/82  82/83  83/84  84/85  85/86  86/87  87/88 
Total expenditure 
Total routine expenditure 
Rrsonnel 
Debt service 
External debt service 
Internal debt service 
Subsidies to regions 
Food subsidy 
Oil subsidy 
Other routine expenditures 
Total development expenditure 
Regional development 
Fertilizer subsidy 
Agriculture & irrigation, 
Indusuy & mining 
Electric power 
Transportation,  tourism & 
communications 
Manpower & transmigration 
Education & culture 
Health & social welfare 
Housing & water supply 




of  project aid 
GDP deflator (1980= 100) 
excluding fertilizer subsidy 
participation 
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not possible without deterrence of foreign aggression.  In the absence of more 
information, it is not possible for us to eliminate the discrepancy between the 
official and economic definitions of  development expenditure. 
The allocation of official development expenditure by program is given in 
table  4.4.  The  general  INPRES  programs  are  funds  channelled  to  local 
authorities to finance public  works projects chosen at their own discretion. 
The  INPRES  village  program  was  started  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Soeharto  era  to  alleviate  rural  unemployment  and  to  rebuild  the  rural 
infrastructure that had been allowed to deteriorate under Soekamo. With the 
growth of the oil sector in the early 1970s, the INPRES district and province 
programs  were  started  partly  to handle  projects  which  affected  more than 
one village and, partly,  because the village administrators were not able to 
absorb more funds. This decentralized decision making in the public works 
projects of the general INPRES programs is very much in line with what we 
have earlier  identified  to be  one  of  Soeharto’s traits-impatience  with  the 
bureaucracy.  While efficiency  was clearly an important  concern, what may 
have been equally important was the political  symbolism of commitment to 
rural development. 
With  the  increased  inflow of  oil revenue,  sectoral INPRES programs  in 
primary education,  health,  reforestation,  market and road construction were 
started  and  funding  to  existing  INPRES  programs  was  increased.  In  real 
terms (1980 prices), the cost of  INPRES programs rose from Rp 276 billion 
in  fiscal  1973  to  Rp  714  billion  in  fiscal  1980.  The  government  also 
expanded its industrialization program: annual government capital participa- 
tion  rose  from Rp 166 billion  to Rp 477  billion  in  the  same period, a  16 
percent annual rate of  increase. Given the easing of the budget constraint,  it 
was only natural that subsequent spending was much broader in coverage. 
4.5  Preferences as Revealed by the Expenditure Pattern 
In  the discussion on political considerations in chapter 3, we identified a 
goal of the Soeharto government to be the improvement of the livelihood of 
the Javanese peasants.  This goal is based  on the fear of  the reemergence of 
the  PKI in  its  traditional  rural  stronghold.  It  must be  emphasized  that  the 
logical  policy  translation  of  this  primary  policy  concern  is to reduce  rural 
poverty and not the degree of rural-urban inequality. The policy emphasis is 
on  the  absolute  standard  of  living rather  than  on the  relative  standard  of 
living. 
Given the history  of separatist movements and the fact that the Javanese 
dominated key government positions, we also identified regional equity to be 
another of  Soeharto’s  primary  political concerns.  The policy  translation  in 
this  case  is the  attenuation  of  differences  in  the  standard  of  living  across 
islands.  Finally,  we  argued  that  the technocrats,  because  of  their belief  in 
comparative advantage, would strive to maintain  and improve the economic Table 4.4  Distribution of  Development Expenditure by  Programs FY1972  to FY  1987 (in  billions of rupiahs) 
Actual  Budget 











General INPRES programs 
Subsidies to provinces 
Subsidies to kabupatens 
Subsidies to villages 







Irian Jaya and East Timor 
Subtotal of transfers to 









150.0  167.3  221.6 
39.3  48.7  101.3 
20.8  20.8  47.4 
12.8  19.2  42.5 
5.7  5.7  11.4 
.O  19.2  25.0 
.O  17.2  19.7 
.o  .o  5.3 
.o  .o  .o 
.o  .o  .o 
.o  .o  .o 
15.2  19.5  28.0 
3.3  3.3  4.0 
57.8  85.7  158.3 
.O  33.0  227.2 
22.5  40.8  91.1 
5.6  10.0  67.7 
235.9  336.3  765.9 
62.3  114.1  195.9 





































































































2,533.2  2,724.6  3,260.9  3,219.5  3,474.4  4,466.5  2,087.7 
336.8  448.1  535.3  538.8  540.4  574.5  599.7 
166.7  215.0  253.0  253.1  253.0  287.3  280.0 
119.4  162.6  193.9  194.1  194.6  188.6  220.8 
50.7  70.5  88.4  91.6  92.8  98.6  98.9 
377.2  584.5  444.2  771.2  824.4  753.7  715.5 
249.8  374.5  267.4  549.3  572.0  526.1  417.2 
50.4  78.8  80.3  87.3  64.6  110.6  114.5 
2.5  6.0  4.5  10.6  25.5  4.4  11.5 
48.6  70.4  49.6  59.4  61.2  42.5  42.3 
25.9  54.8  42.4  64.6  101.1  70.1  130.0 
87.2  94.5  105.2  132.4  157.2  167.5  255.6 














807.6  1,133.9  1,090.4  1,447.6  1,526.2  1,502.6  1,578.0  1,182.8 
283.6  371.4  420.1  324.2  731.6  477.1  671.5  203.5 
476.5  480.9  336.6  591.7  336.1  412.3  207.4  83.4 
385.5  565.3  326.7  448.7  474.9  511.2  243.7  109.0 
4,486.4  5,276.1  5,434.7  6,031.7  6,543.2  7,369.7  4,788.3  2,330.9 
1,429.7  1,663.9  1,924.9  3,867.5  3,408.7  3,503.4  3,507.7  5,425.7 
5,916.1  6,940.0  7,359.6  9,899.2  9,951.9  10,873.1  8,296.0  7,756.6 79  IndonesidChapter 4 
incentives to produce Indonesia’s traditional exports, primary commodities. 
Since the production of  primary commodities is confined to rural Java and 
the Outer Islands, the thrust of the technocrats’ economic program addresses 
two important political objectives of the government. 
It is impossible to conclude from tables 4.3 and 4.4 whether a rural bias 
exists because only a few of the items in them can be easily classified either 
as  pro-rural  or  pro-urban.  The  obvious  pro-rural  items  are  “fertilizer 
subsidy”  and  “agriculture  and  imgation”  in  table  4.3 and  most  of  the 
INPRES  programs  in  table 4.4. The  obvious pro-urban  items  are  “food 
subsidy”  and  “housing  and  water  supply”  in  table  4.3.  Examination of 
these items shows that the pro-rural items tended to be financed first after the 
1973 and  1979 OPEC price increases, and that they also tended to suffer 
smaller cuts when future revenue prospects turned gloomy as in 1977/78 and 
1983/84. 
The  1986/87 fertilizer subsidy allocation provides a striking example of 
rural  income maintenance. In  the  1986/87 recession, while total  nominal 
spending by the government fell by  7 percent in response to lower domestic 
revenue, fertilizer subsidies actually rose by  20 percent in  an  attempt to 
check the fall in rural Javanese income. What is really noteworthy about this 
is  that  the  peasants were  encouraged to  grow more rice at a  time  when 
BULOG, the state rice agency which guarantees the floor price, was on the 
verge of bankruptcy because of the runaway costs of  storing the excess rice 
from the bumper harvests of previous years! 
Another indication that the commitment to rural development is genuine is 
that the first two programs started right after the 1973 oil price increase were 
targeted toward the rural sector. Fertilizer subsidies benefited the agricultural 
sector  directly,  and  the  first  sectoral INPRES  program,  by  focusing on 
primary schools, benefited the rural sector disproportionately. 
The fact that food subsidies, which benefited urban residents dispropor- 
tionately, were started in 1974/75 after the 1973 oil price increases does not 
overturn our hypotheses of rural bias in government policies. The history of 
food  subsidies clearly  shows the  lack  of  a  systematic urban  bias.  Food 
subsidies  were  considered  dispensable.  During  1977/78 when  Pertamina 
needed a cash infusion of Rp 86.4 billion to meet its debt obligations, food 
subsidies were  eliminated that  year. With the  weakening of  oil prices  in 
1982, food subsidies were  drastically reduced  in  1982/83 and  completely 
ended in  1983/84. 
Table 4.5 ranks the provinces by  their nonmining regional gross domestic 
product (RGDP) and details the amount of  central government expenditure 
under  each program by  province.  Despite several sizable deviations, the 
central feature is that government outlay systematically varied inversely with 
the income of  the province. The average total central government spending 
for the poorest one-third of the regions is 26 percent of RGDP, for the middle 
one-third, 21 percent, and for the richest one-third, 17 per~ent.~ 80  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
Table 4.5  Per  Capita Budgetary and Central Government Direct Development 
Expenditures 1980181 
1980  Central  Total 
Nonmining  Development  Spending & 
RGDP Per Capita  INPRES  Central  Expenditure  Nonmining 
Province  (in thousands Rp)  Grant Rp/cap  Subsidy Rpicap  Rp/cap  RGDP 
South East Sulawesi 
West  Nusa Tenggara 
































































































































































Source:  World Bank (1984, 133) 
a  Excluding DKI Jakarta. The figure including Jakarta is  13,661. The high  figure for Jakarta reflects the 
substantial level of  spending on the apparatus of  the Central Government rather than on the development of 
Jakarta itself. 
Examining the big outliers to the practice of awarding more aid to the poor 
provinces  yields  a  very  interesting  finding.  Four  Javanese  provinces- 
Jogjakarta, Central Java, West Java, and East Java-rank  fourth, fifth, sixth, 
and ninth in terms of poverty,  yet only Jogjakarta received  aid higher than 
the average level of  13 percent.  In Jogjakarta’s case, its higher aid level may 
have less to do with its poverty than with the fact that  its sultan played  an 
important  role  in  Soeharto’s rise  to  power  (he was  Soeharto’s first  vice 
president).  East Java’s RGDP is indistinguishable  from those of  Lampung, 
Jambi, Central  Sulawesi, and Bengkulu, but  its aid level is only 9 percent 
while the others receive  13 percnt, 30 percent, 27  percent, and 28  percent, 
respectively. 81  IndonesidChapter 4 
We  interpret this Outer Island bias as a deliberate attempt to lessen the 
seemingly big differences in the absolute amount given to each island. As  it 
is, three Javanese provinces (Central Java, West Java, and East Java) already 
account for Rp 119 billion of  the total amount of Rp 313 billion spent, i.e., 
38 percent. If Jakarta and Jogjakarta are included, then Java is receiving 61 
percent  of  total  budgetary  transfer  and  direct  development  expenditures 
while contributing only 47 percent to total national income. It was, appar- 
ently, necessary to tolerate inequities toward these three Javanese provinces 
in  order  to  have  some  semblance  of  regional  (inter-island)  equity.  The 
political  message  of  table  4.5  is  clear:  the  top  echelon  of  the  Soeharto 
government may be dominated by Javanese, but the government is committed 
to  improving  the  standard  of  living  in  the  Outer  Islands.  This  political 
message is the legacy of the many secessionist movements in the 1950s and 
early  1960s. 
Table 4.6 focuses on a number of  welfare measures in order to provide an 
alternate way  of  determining  the  thrust  of  Indonesian  economic  policy, 
especially its fiscal policy. We  have limited the welfare measures to those 
which  particularly  apply  to  the  poorest  segment.  This  is  because  the 
provision of services to meet the basic needs of the poor is heavily dependent 
on government expenditure. Part A of the table divides the population along 
rural-urban lines.  In  1971 only 58 percent of rural children aged seven to 
twelve attended school compared with 73 percent among urban children. In 
1980 the figures were 81 percent and 90 percent, respectively. In the same 
period the ratio of rural to urban infant deaths declined from 5.5 to 4.6. The 
surprising finding here is that the rural poor may actually eat better than the 
urban poor, 1,47  1 calories per day in the rural sector as against 1,433 in the 
urban sector. Together, these three basic-needs indicators paint a picture of 
improvement in  the  social services being  provided  in  the countryside and 
imply that the Indonesian government does not neglect the rural population. 
Part  B  of  table 4.6 provides a number of  regional welfare measures to 
serve as a consistency check on the conclusions drawn from table 4.5. The 
most  notable difference is  that  the  provision of  health  care  in  the  Outer 
Islands appears to  be  more  pervasive.  The  minimum  average  number of 
health centers in the Outer Islands is at least one and a half times more than 
in Java. The basic health conditions appear to be at least as good in the Outer 
Islands as in Java; the infant mortality rate  and life expectancy are almost 
indistinguishable across the main islands, except for the Eastern Islands. 
The  primary  school enrollment also  saw  uniform  improvements-a  33 
percent improvement in every region. It  is clear that the expenditure of  the 
INPRES primary school program was quite evenly spread among the islands. 
Perhaps the same could be  said about the regional division of  government 
programs  in  general  because  the  poverty  rate  fell  by  approximately  17 
percentage points in both Java and the Outer Islands. 82  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
~ 
Table 4.6  Indicators of Distribution of  Government Expenditures on Basic Needs 
Part A:  Rural-Urban Equity 
1971  I976 
Ratio (ruraYurban) of  number of  infant deaths  5.5  4.6 
School enrollment ratio for 7- 12 year olds 
Rural  51  81 
Urban  73  90 
Rural  Urban 
1,471  1,434  Daily calorie intake among the poorest 40 percent of  sector in  1976 
Part B: Inter-Island Equity 
Health centers per 
Infant mortality rate 
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Sumatra  Kalimantan  Sulawesi  Islands 
36  71  48  50 
139  139  149  NA 
93  106  108  NA 
47.0  46.8  45.2  42.7 
55.4  53.8  52.3  41.8 
(8.4)  (7.0)  (7.1)  (5.1) 
64  60  62  63 







4.6  A Summing Up 
The  examination  of  the  fiscal  system  supports  our  claim  that  the 
technocrats favor an economic strategyy which leads to resource transfers to 
the Javanese hinterland and to the tree crop industries in the Outer Islands. 
The secular decline in trade taxes and low taxation of land relative to income 
reflect Soeharto’s political concern with communism and secession, as well 
as the technocrats’ neoclassical inclination toward the comparative advantage 
doctrine. This favorable tax treatment of the agricultural sector improves the 
rural-urban terms of trade and hence encourages the production of  tradables, 
the presence of  which determines a country’s ability to service its debts. 83  IndonesidChapter 5 
In examining government expenditure,  we  surmised  from  fragmentary 
evidence that government spending was more likely to display a rural rather 
than an urban bias. In the absence of  more detailed data, disproportionate 
weight was given to the budget allocations for fertilizer subsidies, irrigation 
projects,  rural  school programs,  the INPRES village programs,  and  food 
subsidies. Because of  better data,  stronger evidence could be  garnered to 
support  the  hypothesis  that  budget  allocations  were  more  sensitive  to 
inter-island equity. There is in fact evidence that  inter-island equity takes 
precedence over rural-urban equity. This is consistent with  our conjecture 
that the concern for rural development stems more from a desire to eradicate 
poverty than to narrow the rural-urban gap. 
The analysis of this chapter sets the stage for our forthcoming discussion 
on the importance of  political factors in determining the debt outcome. To 
the  extent  that  people  are  consistent  in  their  actions,  the  fact  that  the 
technocrats support, and Soeharto approves of, a fiscal  policy which favors 
the tradable sector means that they would also advocate a similarly-oriented 
exchange  rate  policy.  We  will  show  in  chapter  6  that  exchange  rate 
management has been tempered by political considerations, and will quantify 
in  chapter 8 that this exchange rate policy resulted in Indonesia avoiding a 
debt crisis during 1982-84. 
5  Monetary Policy and Financial 
Structure 
5.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the conduct of monetary policy 
and the development of  the financial sector since  1966. Along  with other 
economic  measures,  financial  policies  have  been  actively  used  by  the 
government to pursue its macroeconomic objectives. During the period  of 
prosperity  in the  1970s, mainly  due to the two oil booms in that  decade, 
there was no incentive for the government to reform the underdeveloped tax 
and  banking  systems  which  were  inherited  from  the  Dutch  colonial 
administration. Major reforms to the financial system in  order to mobilize 
domestic saving were initiated only after the bust of the second oil boom. In 
contrast to the  1966-67  reforms which accomplished a total turnaround of 
the  economy  in  a  relatively  short  period  of  time,  recent  reforms  cannot 
produce quick results. 